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ABSTRACT: Privileging deductive first principles over inductive contingencies, I argue, contributed to 
the economic meltdown of late and will continue to limit the range of reasonable solutions available 
to solve entrenched economic problems. I cite Toulmin’s critique of scientific certainty and the 
rancor over the demise of the ninth planet Pluto to posit a role for rhetoric in making valid claims 
across all fields of study, calling for more productive uncertainty subject to vigorous argumentation.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
The last forty years of American economic policy, according to former longtime head 
of the Federal Reserve, Alan Greenspan, marked an experiment to test the assumed 
efficacy of persons acting in their self-interest for the benefit of all. In response to 
questions from a US Congressional committee seeking information about the causes 
of the financial collapse of 2008, Greenspan conceded, 
  
I made a mistake in presuming that the self-interests of organizations, specifically 
banks and others, were such as that they were best capable of protecting their own 
shareholders and their equity in their firms (Corn, 2008).  
 
The disastrous results of such presumptive certainty spread around the globe, 
pointing to errors in the model. Modern mainstream economists, at least by 
Greenspan’s own account, created the conditions for an economic collapse fostered 
by a mistaken characterization of Adam Smith’s ideas—highlighting the presumed 
sanctity of self-interested behavior and the widespread benefits of the “invisible 
hand.” What is hardly mentioned by strident free market purists and advocates of 
deregulation is that Smith balanced notions of an open marketplace with social and 
civic responsibility, armed as he was with a profound appreciation of human 
behavior and knowledge of rhetoric. I cite Smith’s overtly rhetorical and less 
dogmatic approach in his Wealth of Nations to contrast this with the deductive leap 
taken by political economists in his wake; yet, it was the same Smith who admired 
the use of first principles as a professor of rhetoric and advocated it to his students. 
Under the banner of the didactic method, Smith advised in lectures: 
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[I]n the manner of Sir Isaac Newton, we may lay down certain principles, primary or 
proved, in the beginning, from whence we account for the several phenomena, 
connecting all together by the same chain . . . It gives us pleasure to see the 
phenomena which we reckoned the most unaccountable, all deduced from some 
principle . . . (Smith, 1971, p. 140) 
 
Newton’s manner, as Smith calls it, became what Stephen Toulmin calls “the physics 
that never was” (2001, p. 55), and found adherents for its ability to predict in a 
stable universe, with little need to debate infallible first principles. In this essay, I 
trace the path and consequences of emulating the methods of Newton in pursuit of 
certainty in the field of economics. Before tracing the historical developments that 
contributed to the transformation of the (mainly) inductive philosophy of early 
political economy to the (mainly) deductive science of latter-day economics, I want 
to briefly foreground Smith’s ambivalent relationship with deduction and induction 
in his own writings with the help of one of Plato’s most insightful dialogues on the 
conflict between rhetoric and dialectic: Protagoras. 
Plato’s Protagoras provides a dramatic demonstration of the age-old split 
between rhetoric and philosophy and disputes over methods so central to the 
transformation of political economy to the science of economics. Socrates pays a 
visit to the famous sophist (and namesake of the dialogue) to find out why he thinks 
virtue can be taught. Protagoras, an eloquent speaker in love with the sound of his 
own voice, draws upon historical, cultural, and social themes to defend his position 
that, indeed, virtue is teachable. Meanwhile, Socrates is impatient with Protagoras’ 
voluminous yet spellbinding speech, and he insists on short answers to brief 
questions to move the dialectical contest forward to the truth (and, of course, secure 
a victory) (Plato, 1989, 334e-325). In the end, the debate disintegrates into a puerile 
pouting-match between the foes, and, for Plato, a demonstration of the hubris of 
human beings and corresponding pitfalls of using contrastive methods in pursuing 
truth. To illustrate my analogy, Socrates plays the deductive/abstract philosopher 
(qua-scientist) and Protagoras the inductive/historical sophist (qua-rhetorician). 
Moving back to Smith, I see him as a bit of both Protagoras and Socrates: inductive 
rhetorician and deductive philosopher. Smith “recognized the patent contradiction 
between reality on the ground and conclusions drawn solely from deduction” 
(Kennedy, 2008, p. 137), and so Smith’s “methodology was eclectic,” with a blend of 
the “empirical, the theoretical, the institutional, the philosophical, the static, and the 
dynamic . . . all intermingled” (Sowell, as cited in Milonakis & Fine, 2009, p. 16). In 
short, he applied deductive and inductive methods, and for the rest of economic 
history to the present, the two sides of Smith, like the estranged children of 
Abraham, began their own antagonistic methodological economic traditions. Irish 
historical economist, Cliffe Leslie, first noted this in 1870, pointing to the “dualism” 
in Smith that split into two distinct schools with opposite methods: “[o]ne of them is 
represented by [David] Ricardo as the founder of the deductive method; the other of 
which [Robert] Malthus and [John Stuart] Mill are the chief representatives, 
combines a priori and inductive methods” (Milonakis & Fine, 2009, p. 18). Although 
Smith “employed deductive reasoning,” it was “not of an axiomatic nature,” and as “a 
keen observer . . . of history and different societies” he “frequently used facts to 
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illustrate arguments. In short, his deductions were usually empirically founded” 
(John Phedy, as cited in Milonakis & Fine, 2009, p. 18). Smith may have lectured 
admiringly about Newton’s method, nevertheless, his Wealth of Nations reasons 
from inductive to deductive proofs.  
It wasn’t until 1870 when economics, as a newly emerging social science, 
began to take on in earnest earlier attempts to emulate Newton’s physics. In his 
lectures, years before he wrote the Wealth of Nations, Smith discerns two distinct 
methods in didactic, or instructional, writing; one associated with Aristotle and the 
other with Newton: 
 
[I]n Natural Philosophy, or any other science of that sort, we may either, like 
Aristotle, go over the different branches in the order they happen to [be] cast up to 
us, giving a principle, commonly a new one, for every phenomenon; or, in the 
manner of Sir Isaac Newton, we may lay down certain principles, primary, or 
proved, in the beginning, for whence we account for the several phenomena, 
connecting all together by the same chain. This latter, which we may call the 
Newtonian method, is undoubtedly the most philosophical, and in every science, 
whether of Morals or Natural Philosophy, etc., is vastly more ingenious, and for that 
reason more engaging, than the other. (Smith, 1971, p. 140) 
 
Sharing Smith’s glowing appraisal of Newton’s method was a new professional class 
of experts in the various emerging studies that would become the social sciences. 
Smith scholar Pierre Force ponders Smith’s contrastive methods in his two famous 
works, giving some understanding of the rhetorical method of inquiry and role of 
primary and subordinate propositions in both. Smith’s Theory of Moral Sentiments, 
Force notes, “operates in more geometrico,” advancing a first principle (sympathy) 
followed by the consequences of those principles (2003, p. 127). By contrast, in the 
Wealth, Force adds, Smith employs an analytic strategy, beginning with a problem 
“(what are the causes of the wealth of nations?), and he gradually analyzes the 
problem, by identifying explanatory principles that are more and more general” 
(2003, p. 127). The attraction of this strategy to Smith in the Wealth seems to be that 
it allows an unfolding of general principles grounded in moral precepts drawn from 
actual examples of human behavior. In this light, one can view Smith as a rhetorician 
and moral philosopher who applied his methods to the problems of political 
economy.  
In an attempt to gain the status of a pure science in a Newtonian sense, the 
philosophy of political economy, etched with historical, social, and ethical concerns 
had to be jettisoned and left to re-organize as separate fields of study. Recalling 
Plato’s dramatic dialogue in Protagoras, wherein Socrates’ concept of virtue as an 
individual’s choice for pleasure over pain (1989, 357a-b) (the proto-utility 
maximizing self-contained unit) is pitted against Protagoras’ concept of a pluralistic 
participatory virtue hashed out in the public forum (1989, pp. 327-328) (a 
rhetorically-defined individual situated in a social political arena)—these two 
contrastive methods of discovering virtue in classical philosophy and rhetoric mimic 
competing methods in economics. Rhetoric, as Protagoras maintains, decides the 
meaning of public attitudes about virtue in the public forum, informed by historical 
and sociopolitical contingencies (and where reasonable/inductive methods 
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predominate), whereas, Socrates’ dialectic of scientific certainty (rational/deductive 
methods held to a standard of non-contradiction) is a closed business to serious 
minds (at that time, philosophers, today, perhaps economists) bound to the rules of 
game, leaving aside the contingent concerns so important to rhetoric. Both sides 
insist that their own methods are necessary conditions to reach truth. Put another 
way: for Protagoras, virtue exists in speech acts carried on in public and informed by 
historical and social precedents; for Socrates, virtue exists—period—the properties 
of which can be discovered with the proper methods of inquiry. 
After Smith and the advent of more rigorous scientific approaches, British 
commentators debated the vices and virtues of shedding social and hence moral 
responsibility from political economy to move toward a disinterested economic 
“reality” (a move from labor and class analysis to a science of distribution and 
exchange theory, as it has since become) (Milonakis & Fine, 2009). This snowballed 
into a serious professional feud over the purpose and methods of political economy 
characterized by economic historian Arnold Toynbee in the early 1880s as a “bitter 
argument between economists and human beings” (as cited in Winch, 1996, p. 6). As 
one might guess, the argument continues, a subject that requires a look at a myopic 
desire for scientific certainty across the social sciences and particularly in the study 
of economics.  
In the pages ahead, I examine the limits imposed to inquiry in the 
transformation of political economy to the science of economics, which is shorthand 
for the privileging of rationality over reason, certainty over rhetoric, deduction over 
induction, and ideology over material reality. In addition, this will entail a review of 
the challenges to contemporary rhetoric that have their origins in its strained 
relationship with scientific rationality, which ruptured in earnest with the advent of 
the Enlightenment and the privileging of scientific rhetoric.1 In course, this will 
necessitate a look at rhetoric’s equally strained relationship with the natural and 
social sciences once housed in the catchall field of study known as Philosophy. I will 
conclude by making a case for rhetoric and productive irony (the product of 
uncertainty), but first, I begin with a story that I think narrows the difference 
between knowledge production as science or rhetoric, and outlines the scope of 
persuasion in fields long deemed unimproved by the study and application of 
rhetoric—a look at rhetoric’s troubled relationship with scientific logic illustrated 
within the brief history of the planet Pluto.  
 
2. PLUTO’S DESCENT AND THE LONG NIGHT OF RHETORIC 
 
“Whoa! Pluto's dead," said astronomer Mike Brown, of the California Institute of 
Technology in Pasadena, as he watched a Webcast of the vote. "There are finally, 
officially, eight planets in the solar system.” (Iman, 2006, p. 1) 
 
                                                 
1I say “scientific rhetoric” instead of “scientific method,” because as Richard Rorty points out, “A 
quarrel about method requires a common goal, and a disagreement about the means of reaching it” 
(1982, p. 196). Part of my criticism is aimed at the rhetorical application of scientific methods in 
social scientific fields that may or may not share a common goal, and only tangentially with “The 
Scientific Method” in situ.  
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In 2005, the International Astronomical Union (IAU) decided to end the career of 
Pluto, which had been widely viewed as the ninth planet since its discovery in the 
1930s. The majority of researchers ruled Pluto did not fit a rearticulated definition 
of a planet, which included orbiting the sun, possessing enough mass to assume a 
round shape, and being large enough to dominate its orbit. Pluto failed on the last of 
the three requirements (there were other planetoid objects sharing its orbit), with a 
few participants dissenting (Iman, 2006, pp. 1-2). Of course, Pluto did not become a 
planet through scientific observation alone, and just as quickly as the “known facts” 
of the time created the ninth planet, debate and “other facts” could undo it. Alan G. 
Gross’s The Rhetoric of Science helps us to appreciate the rhetorical and truly 
unremarkable nature of the Pluto controversy, as he argues that scientific 
knowledge is not special, but rather, social. He notes that “scientific discovery is 
properly described as invention . . . To discover is to find out what is already there” 
(Gross, 1990, p. 7), so, he adds, “discovery is not a description of what scientists do: 
it is a hidden metaphor that begs the question of the certainty of scientific 
knowledge” (Gross, 1990, p. 7). In other words, a rhetorical metaphor of discovery 
helped to launch the ninth planet, and thus a new invention (a definition, no doubt 
wrangled over and pleasing no one completely) could return it to just another large 
icy rock orbiting the sun. The gist of the claim is that “planets are like this, not like 
that.” Outside and inside the scientific community, many were aghast, hurt, and 
angry.2 I’m sure many science teachers tried to explain to their disillusioned 
students what even some astronomers failed to appreciate. As Gross explains,  
 
If scientific theories are discoveries, their unfailing obsolescence is difficult to 
explain; if these theories are rhetorical inventions, no explanation of their radical 
vulnerability is necessary. (Gross, 1990, p. 7) 
 
The politics of science reveals what many would rather not know: scientific 
certainty (what is assumed to be known at any given time), like other kinds of 
knowledge and opinion, has a shelf life of unknown duration. Truths, like opinion, 
are not stable, but ever shifting moments of consensus achieved through using 
language, however strong the “evidence” appears to be. No wonder many people 
balked—what other “truths” could fall from the sky? 
Pluto, the former planet, is not the primary concern, but rather, its 
emblematic role as a character spanning the gulf between pure science and applied 
rhetoric. It turns out that planets cannot exist without agreed upon physical 
properties and consensus regarding proper terminology. In this case, deciding what 
it means to be a planet.3 As Kenneth Burke says, “Wherever there is ‘meaning,’ there 
                                                 
2Some thought Pluto and some forty-plus similar objects that did not dominate their orbits should be 
called planets. A few sought an exemption for Pluto, and still others suggested Pluto be included in a 
new class of so-called dwarf planets. A few said that they would go on regarding Pluto as a planet 
(Iman, 2006, p. 2). It was widely reported than many schoolchildren, unaccustomed to reversals of 
catechistic thought, protested and pouted—vowing to never surrender their belief in a ninth planet. 
3 The meaning of a new definition must be argued, it cannot be discovered. The deliberation 
concerning what a planet is provides a case point: “But for now the vote is drawing some opposition. 
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is persuasion,” and persuasion is rhetoric (as cited in Booth, 2004, p. 171). Science 
as a language practice, in this sense, follows a pattern found in Aristotle’s judicial 
and deliberative discourses: “So let it be argued, so let it be decided, so let it be 
done.” Science and its social science cousins often leave these more political aspects 
of bargaining and wrangling definitions out of the picture. Once in a while, a crisis 
like the status of Pluto becomes untenable within the community of experts charged 
with knowing what is and is not a planet, and then non-experts get to see how the 
experts do things. There would be dissent, but the collective will of the voting 
assembly will stand for now.4 
Rhetoric most certainly played a key role in this change, or, in an ironically 
apropos statement by Gross, “Science is less a matter of truth than of making 
worlds” (1990, p. 205). Pluto’s fall from the heavens illustrates the hand of rhetoric 
in domains often viewed as hostile to it, and shows the suasive at work in all 
disciplines, from philosophy and social sciences, to the so-called hard and soft 
sciences. 
Stephen Toulmin’s Return to Reason ends with a clarion call for more 
certainties like Pluto to fall from the sky: 
 
Our first intellectual obligation is to abandon the Myth of Stability that played so 
large a part in the Modern age: only thus can we heal the wounds inflicted on 
Reason by the seventeenth–century obsession with Rationality, and give back a 
Reasonableness the equal treatment of which it was for so long deprived. (Toulmin, 
2001, p. 214) 
 
What this entails, Toulmin argues, is recognition of “the reasonableness of 
narratives” as contrasted with “the rigor of formal proofs,” which further shows the 
difference between “local knowledge of the patterns we find in concrete events, and 
the universal, abstract understanding embodied in purely theoretical points of view” 
(2001, p. 15). Toulmin is preparing the ground for an acceptance of the validity of 
non-formal proofs across the professional disciplines, and he opens up the 
possibility that rhetorical analysis can disturb an impenetrable scientific pretense 
that is borrowed from physics and made to apply to disciplines in the social 
sciences, especially economics. The story of Pluto and its planetary ambitions is, 
ironically, a fitting place to begin this examination, as Isaac Newton’s theories about 
the workings of the planets took part in the creation of the scientific certainty as it 
stands today. 
Returning to Toulmin’s narrative, he traces the historical events that 
hastened what he calls a split between reason and rationality. He asks,  
 
                                                                                                                                                 
Planetary scientist Andy Cheng said the definition is ambiguous, because it hasn't answered the 
question ‘how round is round?’" (Iman, 2006, p. 2). 
4 Alan G. Gross observes a conceptual voting assembly in a less absolutist science: “Indeed, this 
absolutist view of scientific truth now has an alternative, a sophisticated relativism in which truth 
depends not on conformity to a substratum of reality, but on agreement among significant persons” 
(1990, p. 21).  
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Why was Newtonian dynamics seen as the type example of a Serious Science, to be 
emulated by economists, sociologists, and psychologists no less than physiologists 
and biochemists? Why were social scientists so keen to be the ‘Newtons’ of social 
theory? (Toulmin, 2001, p. 47) 
 
He isolates Newton’s Principia Mathematica (influenced by the axiomatic simplicity 
of Euclidean geometry) as the pivotal text that set the standard for future scientific 
works emphasizing universal laws and stable truths (Toulmin, 2001, p. 48). Toulmin 
calls this “the physics that never was” (2001, p. 55) because, as Newton’s 
contemporary and arch-critic Gottfried Leibniz observed, his  
 
theorems proved only that the Law of Gravitation accounts for the motions of one 
planet at a time around a more massive center of attraction, such as the Sun. With 
this simplification, the equations of motion for a single planet are easily solved . . . 
[but] [o]nce we introduce into the picture a third body—say a second planet—the 
equations are, however, no longer algebraically soluble. (Toulmin, 2001, p. 50, 
emphasis in original) 
 
In short, Newtonians had to use “arithmetical dodges” to explain deviations from his 
simplified orbits (Toulmin, 2001, pp. 50-51). This doesn’t mean that Newtonian 
physics wasn’t a groundbreaking achievement and empirically useful, it simply 
means that Newton’s hope of showing a predictably rational God through a 
predictably rational Universe was flawed5 (Toulmin, 2001, p. 55). The beauty and 
simplicity of his equations purporting a stable planetary system could not describe 
the actual workings of the solar system, thus, Toulmin says that “the model that for 
so long held center stage as the ‘the ideal form of theory for any would-be Science’ 
remained that of a Physics that Never Was” (2001, p. 55). Borrowing the form and 
method (the rhetoric) of physics, social scientists hoped to achieve three goals: 
 
a) an abstract theory with a rigorously valid axiom system, b) deductions of the 
nature of human institutions from its universal principles, and 3) scientific 
explanations of the character of particular social institutions. Yet this triple prize 
was never a realistic possibility: it had never been achieved even in planetary 
astronomy. (Toulmin, 2001, p. 54) 
 
The legacy of emulating physics is seen especially in economics, where universal 
applications of principles have been “wrong-headed or even disastrous” (Toulmin, 
2001, p. 60). Toulmin cites the intervention of modern economic theory on the 
Island of Bali, where “rational” attempts to increase rice production caused plagues 
of pests and funguses on a biblical scale. The problem with abstract solutions based 
upon a universal principles is not tied to an inherent flaw in technology or 
economics, but rather, in a belief that their solutions can be founded and applied 
without consulting the entire web of practices and beliefs of the people they are 
                                                 
5 Regarding the stability of the universe: “Astronomers may have discovered the aftermath of a 
collision between a Saturn-size planet and a smaller world, perhaps the size of Uranus, some 170 
light-years away” (Lovett, 2008). Toulmin notes, “in our own time the dynamics of our planetary 
system are still a matter of public concern,” citing other collisions between planetary objects and dire 
predictions of an asteroid hitting the earth (2001, p. 54).  
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supposed to help (Toulmin, 2001, pp. 60-61). If a vibrant rhetoric of economics is to 
move beyond an adherence to numbers and predictions, it must include actual 
human needs, histories, social conditions, cultural beliefs, and stories. At the heart of 
Toulmin’s analysis is his plea for ways of thinking and postulating reality that retain 
a narrative sensibility. Following this, it is helpful to review the current status of 
rhetoric as a field and what is lost by its formal ostracism from serious science. 
Wayne Booth’s The Rhetoric of Rhetoric explores, among other things, how 
neglecting the study of persuasion can make some problems impossible to solve 
without violence or stagnation. Booth sees a role and agenda for rhetoric in the 21st 
century—to combat dishonest, fraudulent, and contemptible rhetoric. For Booth the 
remedy is more rhetorical education not less (2004, pp. xi-xii). What Booth wants is 
recognition of the uses of rhetoric in all fields, and for professionals to ask what 
constitutes good and bad forms of persuasion in each discipline (2004, p. xii). “Bad” 
persuasion comes in many forms, and a virulent strain comes from claims of 
scientific certainty in domains better served by rhetoric sensitive to the political 
exigencies and needs of the community it addresses. As English Studies have long 
explored the texts of powerful fictional literature, Rhetoric Studies should engage 
the persuasive fictions of economics that wield so much power,6 reclaiming for 
study the various compartments Aristotle included in his Rhetoric—ethics, politics, 
psychology, logic, history, and poetics (Burke, 2008, p. 51).  
The split between formal logic and reason (rhetoric) might be tolerable or 
even admirable in a world that recognized the same distinctions within human 
affairs. Perhaps we should be grateful that there can be neither purely logical nor 
purely rhetorical endeavors, for this is what makes us human. Antonio Grassi, in 
Rhetoric as Philosophy, writing about the Italian Humanists’ response to Descartes’ 
war on the humanities, points to the same issue in the realm of philosophical 
studies, which, he claims, is hobbled by the eviction of probable, situated, and 
politically prudent courses of action in favor of single standard of truth:  
 
The defects of rationalistic, critical philosophy are much more than they appear at 
first sight. By failing to take into account political faculties and the art of eloquence, 
this philosophy disregards two of the most important branches of human activity. 
The one-sided concern about truth misses the preparation for recognizing 
individual cases, and it ignores the necessity for political education. (Grassi, 1980, p. 
40) 
 
With political education, we return to the realm of rhetoric, which includes concerns 
about ethics and morals, and which must deliberate with care to the collective and 
individual, not universals. Here, we can hear echoes of Booth’s manifesto and 
Toulmin’s claim (repeated by contemporary rhetoricians across the board) that 
neglect of the virtues of rhetoric (i.e. argument and debate) limits the ability of 
problems to be addressed by negating a whole range of arguments now deemed 
extrinsic to thoughtful consideration. 
                                                 
6 Victor Villanueva, in “Toward a Political Economy of Rhetoric,” laments the lack of attention to the 
economic texts that carry so much ideological weight and referee material outcomes, writing: “There 
is a rhetoric of economics, a rhetoric of political economy. We need only to reclaim it” (2005, p. 62).  
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In the final analysis, the “scientific method,” like other uses of language that 
persuade and construct a vision of reality, is both rhetorical and ideological. For 
many early followers of Newton and Galileo, both of whom used mathematical 
symbols to represent the natural world, the vocabulary of science was closer to 
truth, to God. Many thought that the language itself represented a new window on 
reality. For Richard Rorty, the success wasn’t due to “something called the ‘scientific 
method,’” but rather, it was the ability to finally predict with “simple mathematical 
ratios” (1982, p. 191). 
 
Galileo and his followers discovered, and subsequent centuries have amply 
confirmed, that you get much better predictions by thinking of things as masses of 
particles blindly bumping each other than by thinking of them as Aristotle thought 
of them—animistically, teleologically, and anthropomorphically. They also 
discerned that you get a better handle on the universe by thinking of it as infinite 
and cold and comfortless than by thinking it as finite, homey, planned, and relevant 
to human concerns. (Rorty, 1982, p. 191) 
 
Echoes of the siren call of objectivity are apparent here, and the need to remove the 
human from such a cold and mechanical natural world. Galileo, Rorty tells, believed 
his “vocabulary worked because it fitted the universe as a key fits a lock” (1982, p. 
192). Kant suggested those with the key, perhaps unwittingly, made the lock (Rorty 
1982, p. 192). In any case, the cat was out of the bag, and it appears that the method 
of science is not so different from what humans do in every activity: 
 
They check off examples against criteria; they fudge the counter-examples enough 
to avoid the need for new models; they try out various guesses, formulated within 
the current jargon, in the hope of coming up with something which will cover up the 
unfudgeable cases. (Rorty, 1982, p. 193) 
 
Newton’s calculations were also simplified, and mathematical dodges used to “cover 
up the unfudgeables.” This sounds a lot like the way planets are “discovered” and 
demoted. In fact, the Pluto story recounts the use of criteria (how to define a planet); 
a fudging of counter-examples (other orbiting objects equal in size to Pluto but not 
called planets); a new model that becomes no longer avoidable (having been fudged 
for too long many astronomers believed); and so the process begins again, with new 
jargon (terminology) to describe a planet, and new criteria with a different quality 
of fudging (i.e., “how round is round?” (Iman, 2006, p. 2)—not perfect, but 
eliminating today’s inconsistencies).  
 
3. EMBRACING RHETORIC, UNCERTAINTY, AND IRONY 
 
So, in answer to those in the humanities seeking to find the magic formulae to the 
success of the sciences through a rhetoric that mirrors reality, Rorty replies,  
 
Galileo’s terminology is the only ‘secret’ he had—he didn’t pick that terminology 
because it was ‘clear’ or ‘natural’ or ‘simple,’ or in line with the categories of the 
pure understanding. He just lucked out. (p. 193) 
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I suppose this means that Galileo did what anyone faced with a rhetorical challenge 
must do: find a way to communicate a message to an intended audience. The point is 
that science and social science do not differ in their methods as a rule, as they both 
employ a language designed to convince. Social scientist can use scientific 
terminology when they want to convince that they can predict, and this can be 
successful (especially if this is what audiences expect), but the practical realizations 
of those predictions are markedly less so. As Rorty points out, “the last fifty years of 
research in the social sciences have not notably increased our predictive abilities” 
(Rorty, 1982, p. 197; see also Taleb, 2007). 
What Toulmin, Grassi, and Rorty all prize is the ability of the humanities and 
social sciences to tell us stories, to interpret other people to us, and to introduce us 
to subjective experiences in the world we share but often see so differently. In a 
rhetorical practice that doesn’t deny the homey comfort of human emotions, and in 
which individual and cultural narratives are allowed to commingle with now less 
“cold” and less “value-neutral” facts, there is potential for “enlarging and deepening 
our sense of community” (Rorty, 1982, p. 203). Rorty hopes that  
 
[w]hen the notion of knowledge as representation goes, then the notion of inquiry 
as split into discrete sectors with discrete subject matter goes. . . . The lines between 
subject matters are drawn by reference to current practical concerns, rather than 
putative ontological status. (p. 203) 
 
Here, I see Rorty’s neo-pragmatism (or anti-theory theory) capturing the challenge 
for rhetoric studies moving forward. Speaking to practical concerns of 
contemporary rhetoric, a study of the rhetorics-across-the-disciplines should be 
aware of its own fudging of counter-examples and, taking a cue from Booth, they 
should be alert to the “good” as well as the “bad” in the social sciences. Rorty points 
out that Michel Foucault saw the dark side of social science (“instruments of 
domination”) while John Dewey saw the hopeful side (“social engineering”) (1982, 
p. 204). Rorty opts for hope above gloom, and a possibility for transformation of 
institutions through solidarity and collective action (1982, p. 208). Of course, 
rhetoric, like science, can evince a common picture of the world by consulting its 
various components, but we should be mindful of limitations even as we celebrate 
its capacity. Steve Fuller and James H. Collier, seeking to build interdisciplinary 
connection across the humanities and social sciences, see contemporary rhetoric as 
insightful to the ways knowledge is produced and communicated. They also remind 
us that friends of rhetoric 
 
tend to overemphasis the community-building functions of well-chosen language, 
often harboring some fairly nostalgic (if not downright mythical) views about the 
degree of common ground that is achievable or desirable between people. (Fuller & 
Collier, 2004, p. 14) 
 
I too find hope irresistible, but a little gloom and doom, and large measure of “what 
other people think” can help keep rhetoricians from over-fudging their own 
accounts. 
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There have been other calls to bridge the divide between methodological 
camps. Of course, according to Aristotle, both methods need each other, as the 
deductive and inductive dialectic method defines certainties to the point where 
parties can at least agree to the terms and issues to be discussed, at which point 
rhetoric steps in to finish the job of proposing a course of action (a judgment or an 
attitude is reached). This is the rhetoric of particular cases: (non-universal) 
questions of probable truth (Kennedy, 1963, p. 96-7). William James, offering 
pragmatism as the answer to the dichotomy between humanism and science, writes, 
 
You want a scientific loyalty to facts and willingness to take account of them, the 
spirit of adaption and accommodation, in short, but also the old confidence in 
human values and the resultant spontaneity, whether of the religious or the 
romantic type. (as cited in McCloskey, 1994 , p. 70) 
 
Deidre McCloskey says, “Economists can do better than taking sides between 
thought and feeling, between the Sciences and the Humanities” (1994, p. 70). 
Modern economics needs to reengage the methods of Adam Smith, McCloskey holds, 
by “analyzing both action and behavior, understanding the reasonableness of what 
people do down in the ruck of the market and seeing them also ‘from the eighth 
floor,’ as a sociologist put it” (1994, p. 70). The problem is complicated, because, as 
Milonakis and Fine explain, “whilst economics profoundly reflects historical and 
social processes both materially and ideologically, it is blissfully ignorant of them 
and wishes to remain so” (2009, p. 4). 
In The Rhetoric of Economics, Deidre McCloskey defines all economics as 
rhetorical because it is “speech with intent” to persuade, and although she concedes 
(along with Booth) that rhetoric is “not everything,” it is “everywhere in the speech 
of human persuaders” (1998, p. 8). McCloskey points out that modern economists 
with exclusive scientific pretensions such as  
 
Robert Solow or Milton Friedman do not know anything of classical rhetoric—they 
grew up at the nadir of rhetorical education—but they can spot when a formal 
assumption is being used well or badly, and they can sense when this or that verbal 
device is appropriate. And the wordcraft that the best economists exercise by 
instinct can be taught, at least a little. (McCloskey, 1998, p. 5) 
 
The notion of teaching rhetoric is bound with the notion of teaching virtue, a contest 
also explored in the conflict between Socrates and Protagoras. Focusing on the kinds 
of stories economists like to tell, McCloskey also apprehends a proving of opposites 
as conducive to a shared search for meaning and the ability of “small t” truth to 
explain reality, suggesting that a “variety in economic narratives is good for the soul. 
Marxist narrative provides a criticism of the bourgeoisie ‘neo-classical’ narrative, 
and vice versa” (McCloskey, 1998, p. 146). Booth celebrates the call and response of 
answering rhetoric with still more rhetoric in the form of powerful narratives to 
counter other powerful narratives, noting that the “serious ethical disasters 
produced by narratives occur when people sink themselves into an unrelieved hot 
bath of one kind of narrative” (as cited McCloskey, 1990, p. 146). Recalling 
Greenspan’s testimony in front of congress about “smart people,” the best minds of 
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the Federal Reserve, who could not foresee the 2008 collapse of the economy (Corn, 
2008), an adherence to preferred perspectives and covert rhetorical methods of 
inquiry (both grounds for “small t” truth and “big T” Truth) is the hot water of the 
current crisis. The rhetorical appeal of methodologies bound to first principles (a 
rhetoric of method) may be aesthetically pleasing but not necessarily the route to 
unimpeachable truth. In his lectures on rhetoric, Smith, in another demonstration of 
his ambivalence concerning method, seizes upon the distinction between a 
perception of truth earned by following a method and an actual apprehension of 
reality:  
 
We need not be surprised, then, that the Cartesian philosophy (for Descartes was in 
reality the first who attempted this method), though it does not perhaps contain a 
word of truth,—and to us who live in a more enlightened age and have more 
inquired into these matters, it appears very dubious,—should nevertheless have 
been so universally received by all the learned in Europe at that time. The great 
superiority of the method over that of Aristotle, the only one then known, and the 
little inquiry which was then made into those matters, made them greedily receive a 
work which we justly esteem one of the most entertaining romances that have ever 
been wrote (sic). (Smith, 1971, p. 40) 
 
Smith has it right. Indeed, a great story made great by its rhetorical method is likely 
to deceive by its appearance of infallibility. In the realm of one-sided economics, 
where one hand (the rational scientific) does the work of the other (the reasonable 
social), the consequences are disastrous. We need Protagoras and Socrates, and a 
host of other voices to school us in the range of disagreement required to live a 
critical life. Trumpeting the need for vigorous argumentation, McCloskey writes, 
 
If economists tell stories and exercise an ethical sense when telling them, then they 
had better have as many stories as possible. This is a principled justification of 
pluralism, an argument for not keeping all one’s eggs in a single narrative basket. If 
you are accustomed to thinking in Platonic terms within which knowledge consists 
mainly in propositions like the irrationality of the square root of two, provable now 
and forever, then monism looks attractive. There’s One Truth out there, isn’t there. If 
you are by contrast accustomed to thinking in Aristotelian terms within which 
knowledge consists of judgments like the desirability of democracy, uncertain even 
when agreed to after much discussion of people of good will, then monism in the 
tales we tell looks foolish, as it is. (McCloskey, 1990, p. 146) 
 
In Protagoras the debacle between Socrates and Protagoras is perhaps another 
moment in which Plato shows us the problem of democracy, which is a good 
problem to have, considering the alternatives; but pluralism in the economics of 
modern American democracy (in theory and policy) is rarely honored or practiced, 
except in times of periodic crisis, when alternatives are required to save face and 
prevent further harm (bailouts, new deals, stimulus packages, and all the rest). In 
spite of reasonable voices pointing to facts on the ground that undermine the 
professed success in the last forty years of neo-liberal laissez faire policies (see 
Klein, 2007; Greider, 1997; Chang, 2008; Phillips, 2008), modern mainstream 
economics occupies the rostrum, that is, until something bad happens, to be 
followed by a band aid approach to “saving markets” while the fundamental 
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problems remain. The experiment in free-markets as a panacea to human fulfillment 
and harmony (Greenspan’s “it was working exceptionally well” (Corn, 2008)) 
represents a lack of productive irony—productive in the sense of proposing less 
“certain” but more “reasonable” versions of reality. If rhetoric may be accused of 
deliberately producing irony, then it may wear that accusation quite well. Burke 
notes in his dramatistic analogue to dialectical rhetorical speech that in “a 
development that uses all the terms . . . (this ‘perspective of perspectives’), none of 
the participating ‘sub-perspectives’ can be treated precisely right or precisely wrong 
(1969, p. 512, emphasis in original). In other words, Burke observes how rhetorical 
debates are similar to dramatic performances, wherein, “all voices, or personalities, 
or positions, integrally [affect]one another” (1969, p.512). The economic crisis was 
nurtured by a dominating sub-perspective of a scientifically modeled economics 
that fudges to accommodate messy practical contingencies apparent to contrary 
voices in the dialectic performance. An extreme deductive and positivist mainstream 
economics like Milton Friedman’s begins with assumptions “that need bear no 
relation to reality; it can even be claimed that theory has greater purchase the more 
unrealistic its assumptions”(Milonakis & Fine, 2009, p. 69). In this “theoretical 
world,” if “ex post reality checks” (data to verify or falsify) do not confirm the 
theory, this can “be accommodated by appropriate statistical manipulation or model 
refinement” (Milonakis & Fine, 2009, p. 69). In other words, more fudging to make 
the beautiful models function as intended. 
In this light, concerns about the loss of “positive” knowledge in a world of 
“relative” claims are wholly misplaced. “In relativism,” Burke says (applying a 
rigorous definition of the word) “there is no irony,” because it sees “but one set of 
terms,” and so in a strict sense, a relative viewpoint is, ironically, a sub-certainty 
parading as the absolute last word on the subject7 (1969, pp. 512-513). So much for 
the line between pure and fuzzy truths, and Burke offers a continuum, or ratio, to 
measure the ironic inverse relationship: “the greater the absolutism of the 
statements, the greater the subjectivity and relativity in the position of the agent 
making the statements” (1969, pp. 512). An absolute stand is “relativistic” if this 
means choosing one reigning side of a dialectical situation in its entirety. Irony is a 
suspension of contraries, neither totally right nor totally wrong, and thus, what is ‘A’ 
can return as ‘non-A’ (i.e., Pluto the planet and not a planet), even if it means 
abandoning certainty for irony. 
Irony is integral to the human condition; perhaps this is why it is the stuff of 
great drama and tragedy, but a bit of certainty is good for ease of mind and a 
measure of common ground. So, what to make of charges of relativism (this time the 
“relativism” as bogeyman to rational thinking) against those who condone a more 
rhetorical pursuit of “small t” truth? If “relativism” is taken to mean, “anything goes, 
arguments are all equal, scholarship does not advance, [and] we have no way of 
reaching common ground,” then McCloskey, and other reasonable and rational 
people, condemn this too (McCloskey, 1994, p. 315). That brand of “relativism” is the 
bogeyman of clear thinking, but the good news is that “[i]f there were any real 
                                                 
7 One might call this a tu quoque, as it does insinuate that “relativism” sticks best to the “positivists” 
hurling the accusation.  
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relativists,” Rorty holds, “they would, of course, be very easy to refute” (as cited in 
McCloskey, 1994, p. 315, emphasis in original). The iron rule of irony is that 
contrastive pairs only appear to offer a clear choice between contraries—when, in 
fact, they can only name perspectives, attitudes, relevancies, and judgments about 
the dramatic situation (Burke, 1969, pp. 511-513). And thus, all is not lost if the 
threshold of rhetoric is crossed, as two plus two will still equal four, and besides, 
McCloskey quips, 
 
one does not give up the ability to distinguish between the Ajax Kitchen Cleanser 
jingle and Gödel’s Proof by noting that both are designed with an audience in mind, 
with perlocutionary force, with patterns of repetition, with a style suited to the 
occasion, with an implied author, with metaphor, synecdoche, and all the rest. 
(McCloskey, 1994, p. 290) 
 
A rhetorical view of need satisfaction invested in the relationship between 
economics and human communities is, it turns out, more cognizant of a deeply felt 
and lived social reality than any “perfect” economic model can reveal. It is, at last, 
the grown up approach to the most important human questions about how we will 
live and die, and an optimistic and empowered response to what Thomas Carlyle 
called an otherwise “dismal science.” 
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